

The Overlapping Generations Model of Money

Econ 208

Lecture 13

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- Need something with better micro foundation than money in the utility function
- The role of confidence in supporting the value of money shd be made explicit
- if people believe fiat money will be worthless then it will be
- Basic assumptions:
 - Economy has an infinite horizon
 - Each person lives for 2 periods
 - Just one good, non-storeable
 - Each young person endowed with $y > 0$
 - Each old person unendowed
 - Utility of generation t : $u_t = u(c_{1t}, c_{2t})$
 - Population growth rate n : $N_t = (1 + n)^t$

Equilibrium with no money

- No gains from borrowing or lending
- Therefore no one consumes when old
- Everyone attains

$$u^{autarky} = u(y, 0)$$

- This is probably socially inefficient because old people are starving and would pay a lot to consume if they could
- Define the “autarky rate of interest” r^A as the slope of an indifference curve in autarky (-1):

$$1 + r^A = \frac{u_1(y, 0)}{u_2(y, 0)}$$

(show diagram)

- Then the autarky equilibrium without money is socially inefficient if $r^A < n$.

Socially Efficient Allocations

- Each period, the social resource constraint is:

$$N_t c_{1t} + N_{t-1} c_{2,t-1} = N_t y$$

Divide by N_t :

$$c_{1t} + \frac{1}{1+n} c_{2,t-1} = y$$

(show diagram)

- This looks like the individual's lifetime budget constraint when the rate of interest is n .
- This means that n is the “biological rate of interest”

Social Inefficiency without Money

- If $n > r^A$ then people are getting less than the biological rate of interest in autarky, so autarky is inefficient
- To make a Pareto improvement from autarky, get each young individual to give up ε and give each old person $(1 + n)\varepsilon$. This is feasible and will raise each generation's lifetime utility (see diagram)
- Why does the first welfare theorem fail here? Because not everyone participates
- It depends on having an infinite horizon (Gamov's hotel).
- Social improvement could be implemented by social security scheme.
- The optimal allocation for all but generation 0 is where $r = n$ (show diagram)

Perfect foresight equilibrium with money

Suppose there are M units of some storeable object (token money, fiat money)
Suppose now that each old person at time 1 starts the period holding M/N_0 of money.

Keep M constant over time

Now people can trade the good for money

A perfect foresight equilibrium can have two forms.

- 1 Autarky is still an equilibrium. If everyone thinks that the tokens will be worthless then they will be, and people will consume their endowments when young.
- 2 Monetary equilibrium - a time path $\{P_1, P_2, \dots\}$ of *finite* prices such that if everyone knows this path will be followed then supply of goods = demand for goods each period.

Monetary Equilibrium

- Each young person chooses (c_{1t}, c_{2t}) to

$$\max u(c_{1t}, c_{2t}) \quad \text{subj to } P_{t+1}c_{2t} = (y - c_{1t})P_t, \text{ that is:}$$

$$\max u(c_{1t}, c_{2t}) \quad \text{subj to } c_{1t} + (1 + \pi_t)c_{2t} = y, \text{ where}$$

$$1 + \pi_t \equiv P_{t+1}/P_t$$

- In effect, they are saving at the rate of interest r_t defined by

$$1 + r_t = \frac{1}{1 + \pi_t}$$

- So the demand for goods by the young is

$$c_{1t} = \tilde{c} \left(\frac{1}{1 + \pi_t} \right)$$

- Each old person at t just spends M/N_{t-1}

Monetary Equilibrium (cont'd)

- The equilibrium condition each period is the social resource constraint:

$$c_{1t} + \frac{1}{1+n} c_{2,t-1} = y$$

$$\tilde{c}(P_t/P_{t+1}) + \frac{1}{1+n} \frac{M}{N_{t-1}P_t} = y$$

$$\tilde{c}(P_t/P_{t+1}) + \frac{M}{N_t P_t} = y$$

- As usual in forward looking models this determines P_t in terms of P_{t+1}
- A **stationary** monetary equilibrium is a monetary equilibrium with

$$(c_{1t}, c_{2t}) = (c_1, c_2), \text{ constant}$$

Stationary Monetary Equilibrium (cont'd)

- In a stationary monetary equilibrium

$$1 + \pi_t = \frac{1}{1 + n} \text{ for all } t$$

- This is because the budget constraint requires

$$c_1 + (1 + \pi_t) c_2 = y$$

while the equilibrium condition requires

$$c_1 + \frac{1}{1 + n} c_2 = y$$

and for this to be monetary we need $c_2 > 0$.

- So a stationary monetary equilibrium delivers the “optimal” allocation, because it allows young people to save at the biological rate of interest
- The quantity theory of money holds (and monetary neutrality) because

$$c_2 = \frac{M}{P_t N_{t-1}} = \text{constant}$$

Existence of stationary monetary equilibrium

- A stationary monetary equilibrium exists if and only if autarky is inefficient
- This is because

$$\text{autarky inefficient} \Leftrightarrow r^A > n \Leftrightarrow \tilde{c}(1+n) < y \Leftrightarrow c_2 > 0$$

(show diagram)

- So money has a socially useful role to play here
- In effect it solves the problem of absence of double coincidence of wants

Stationary monetary equilibrium with a time-varying money supply

- Suppose each person of generation t is given a transfer equal to:

$$\frac{TR_{t+1}}{N_t}$$

just before trading at time $t + 1$.

- The money supply starts at M_1 and then:

$$M_{t+1} = M_t + TR_{t+1}$$

- Assume constant money growth:

$$TR_{t+1} = \mu M_t, \text{ so } M_{t+1} = (1 + \mu) M_t$$

Stationary monetary equilibrium with a time-varying money supply (cont'd)

- Each young person chooses (c_{1t}, c_{2t}) to

$\max u(c_{1t}, c_{2t})$ subj to $P_{t+1}c_{2t} = (y - c_{1t})P_t + TR_{t+1}$, that is:

$\max u(c_{1t}, c_{2t})$ subj to $c_{1t} + (1 + \pi_t)c_{2t} = y + (1 + \pi_t)tr_{t+1}$, where

$$tr_{t+1} \equiv TR_{t+1}/P_{t+1}$$

- Equilibrium condition:

$$c_2 = \frac{M_t}{N_{t-1}P_t}, \text{ constant} \Leftrightarrow 1 + \pi_t = \frac{1 + \mu}{1 + n}$$

- First-order condition:

$$\frac{u_1(c_1, c_2)}{u_2(c_1, c_2)} = \frac{1}{1 + \pi_t} = \frac{1 + n}{1 + \mu}$$

- An SME will not be efficient if $\mu > 0$, because again people will be receiving less than the biological rate of interest (show diagram)

The Diamond model with money

- Problem with the basic OLG model - no store of value except money
- But this can sometimes be fixed up by adding productive capital as in the Diamond model.
- Assumptions
 - Old people hold capital and money
 - Young endowed with labor
 - firms produce according to $Y_t = F(K_t, N_t)$ where now N_t is the size of gen t .
 - r_t is the real rate of interest on loans to firms
 - w_t the real wage rate

The Diamond model

Young person's decision problem

maximize $u(c_1, c_2)$ subject to:

$$\tilde{k}_{t+1} + (1 + \pi_t) \tilde{m}_{t+1} = w_t - c_1 \text{ and}$$

$$c_2 = (1 + r_{t+1}) \tilde{k}_{t+1} + \tilde{m}_{t+1}, \text{ where}$$

$\tilde{m}_{t+1}, \tilde{k}_{t+1}$ denote per member of gen t

- First-order conditions:

$$u_1(c_1, c_2) = \lambda_1$$

$$u_2(c_1, c_2) = \lambda_2$$

$$\lambda_1 = (1 + r_{t+1}) \lambda_2$$

$$(1 + \pi_t) \lambda_1 \geq \lambda_2, (\tilde{m}_{t+1} = 0 \text{ if } >)$$

- So for $\tilde{m}_{t+1} > 0$ we need

$$(1 + \pi_t)(1 + r_{t+1}) = 1$$

The Diamond model

Monetary Equilibrium

- In a monetary equilibrium we need the same rate of return on saving in the form of money or capital, so

$$y - c_{1t} = \tilde{s}(w_t, r_{t+1})$$

- A monetary equilibrium, given k_0 , is a sequence $\{m_t, k_t, \pi_t\}_0^\infty$ (per gen t) such that for each t , $m_t > 0$ and

$$\begin{aligned}(1+n)(k_{t+1} + (1+\pi_t)m_{t+1}) &= s(w(k_t), f'(k_{t+1}) - \delta) \\ (1+\pi_t)(1+f'(k_{t+1}) - \delta) &= 1 \text{ and} \\ (1+n)(1+\pi_t)m_{t+1} &= m_t \text{ (constant money supply)}\end{aligned}$$

- A stationary monetary equilibrium is (m, k, π) such that $m > 0$ and

$$\begin{aligned}(1+n)(k + (1+\pi)m) &= s(w(k), f'(k) - \delta) \\ (1+\pi)(1+f'(k) - \delta) &= 1 \text{ and} \\ (1+n)(1+\pi) &= 1\end{aligned}$$

The Diamond model

Existence of Stationary Monetary Equilibrium

All necessary condition for SME is

$$f'(k) - \delta = n$$

That is, an SME must achieve the golden-rule capital stock per worker k^g !

Also necessary is

$$s(w(k), n) > (1 + n)k$$

(otherwise $m = 0$).

So a SME exists if and only if **capital overaccumulation** occurs without money.(see diagram)